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Código Penal and the tensions it exhibits between religious and judicial concepts of 
repentance, or by alluding to the Truth and reconciliation Commissions and their at-
tempts to negotiate deep resentments by appeals to forgiveness. in sum, K. has fulfilled 
his task admirably: “if . . . i have stimulated some doubts about the very concept of 
forgiveness in a way that invites further inquiry, the intention of this book will have 
been fulfilled” (p. 171).
     Susanna Elm 
     University of California at Berkeley
The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece: Matter, Sensation, and Experi-
ence. By JaMes i. porter. Cambridge and new York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010. Pp. [xvii] + 607.
This is a big book (though only the first installment of a promised trilogy) with a 
bold, insistent, and contentious agenda. its aim is nothing less than to redefine how 
aesthetics should be understood in antiquity and thereby reconceive the place of an-
tiquity in the larger history of aesthetics. in pursuing this aim, James Porter takes on 
those he considers to be his opponents: above all, Plato and Aristotle. he holds these 
two thinkers responsible for having created versions of “formalism” and “idealism” 
that have skewed most subsequent approaches to aesthetics right up to the present by 
allegedly repudiating the senses, showing scant interest in the materiality of art, and 
valuing a plane of cognitive experience that depends on suprasensory abstractions.
equating aesthetics, in a manner heavily influenced by John dewey, with the mani-
fold experience of works of art or of practically anything else in the world as “phe-
nomenal and material objects, . . . palpable and sensuous” (p. 10), P.’s work ranges 
across, and attempts to make connections between, the zones of poetics, art history, 
music theory, rhetoric, science, and more besides. in fact, one of the secondary aims 
of the project is to break down excessively rigid barriers of subdisciplinary special-
ization in classics and to open up aesthetics as the entire field of play of “sensation 
and perception” (terms P. treats as virtually synonymous) in the experience of “all 
imaginable forms of art in antiquity” (p. 7)—or even (in a characteristically expansive 
but nebulous formulation) “whenever questions of how one experiences phenomena 
arise” (p. 47). P.’s methods of argument and analysis are accordingly eclectic and 
free-roaming: “no text and no artifact will be immune to plundering for its indexical 
value to the newly expanded category of the aesthetic” (p. 68). The results are notable 
more for their dynamically exploratory spirit than for strict adherence to a steady line 
of reasoning. readers may find this either exhilarating or disconcerting—or possibly 
a bit of both.
The broad compass of this energetically, and often polemically, pursued project 
makes summary difficult. here is a mere thumbnail sketch. Chapter 1 vigorously 
contests the thesis (particularly associated with Paul Oscar Kristeller) that aesthetics, 
and even “art,” was an invention of the eighteenth century. it urges that the concept 
should embrace sensibilities, perceptual habits, and ways of thinking that can inform 
the whole texture of cultural experience, and it stresses the cross-artistic, cross-modal 
nature of much of the ancient material that the book will draw into its ambit. Chap-
ter 2 launches the critique of Platonico-Aristotelian “formalism,” a heresy accused of 
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“dematerialising” art; in addition, P. invokes a number of modern thinkers (including 
Viktor shklovsky [not a “formalist” in P.’s book], mikhail Bakhtin, susan sontag, 
and the early new Critics) whom he finds congenial to his own materialist alternative. 
Chapter 3 maintains that classics as a discipline has been infected by Platonic ideal-
ism and is hence averse to the authentic materiality of art. P. traces the idea of matter/
materialism back to the Presocratics, in whom he also finds evidence of “aesthetic” 
intuitions, including a nascent “phenomenalism” and premonitions of the sublime. his 
treatment of the Presocratics shows how thin the line is between thought-provoking 
hypotheses and flimsy surmise: the claim that leucippus and democritus may have 
pioneered plot analysis of drama (p. 235) is a case of the latter.
The book’s five central chapters are thematically rich and wide-ranging. empha-
sizing how much of ancient aesthetic thinking depends on comparison and cross-
fertilization between different arts, chapter 4 highlights the intensity of the “aesthetic 
public sphere” created by the explosion of art in late fifth-century Athens. it detects a 
leaning toward aesthetic subjectivism on the part of Protagoras and democritus, and 
also examines the latter’s interest in a style of “componential” (atomizing) analysis 
that paves the way for later criticism of poetic language. The attack on Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s allegedly anti-materialist tendencies is picked up again here. Chapter 5 
uses Aristophanes’ Frogs to anchor some reflections (many of them astute) on what 
happens when aesthetics tries to get to grips evaluatively with the physical materials 
of art; it also advances a view of Gorgias as a qualified materialist. Chapter 6 is built, 
sometimes rather loosely, around a set of ideas on the nature of authorial “voice” as 
a quasi-material presence to be located (or imagined) in the sensory properties of 
written texts: among other things, P. provides some real insight here into the views of 
Alcidamas and isocrates.
Chapter 7, the most technical and speculative in the book (readers might want to 
glance ahead at the résumé on p. 399), attempts to reconstruct lasus of hermione’s 
musico-poetic aesthetics of sound and to uncover an Archaic complexity in this area 
which was later occluded by opponents of the new music who ideologically projected 
simplicity and purity back onto the earlier period. Chapter 8 examines some of the 
qualities of visuality that characterize Greek art; incorporating P.’s own close readings 
of a number of artifacts (an early Cycladic sculpture and two Attic red-figure vases 
among them), it contests historical narratives like that of Alois riegl which posit a 
progression from Archaic “tactility” to Classical illusionism. The book’s final, rather 
diffuse, chapter is devoted to multiple connections/analogies between verbal and ar-
chitectural/sculptural art: zigzagging between Archaic material (simonides, inscribed 
epigrams), the hellenistic period (Posidippus, euphonist criticism), and longinus, P. 
conjures up what he takes to be a long-lasting Greek sense of sublimity that involves 
a fused awareness of monumentality and vulnerability.
The above outline cannot convey the impressive array of scholarly expertise dis-
played by P. in this book, let alone the abundance of subtle observations he has to 
offer on a remarkable spread of phenomena and ideas, all of them tackled with in-
tellectual bravura. The book is an important and multi-faceted contribution to the 
study of ancient aesthetics. Although it is hardly quite as pathbreaking as it claims 
(“Approaches to aesthetics as a legitimate domain of thought and inquiry in antiquity 
are virtually non-existent,” p. 6, is a typical instance of the author’s self-hyping), the 
work has a freshness and incisiveness of viewpoint that is bound to stimulate debate 
for many years. its main achievement is the demonstration that it is indeed possible, 
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with eye-opening and challenging results, to widen the category of aesthetics in a way 
that can be studied through an “interdisciplinary” combination of poetic criticism, 
art history, musicology, philosophy, and more besides. Aesthetics, on P.’s revisionist 
account, aspires to establish a “unified field theory” (p. 483) of large areas of ancient 
culture, as well as contributing cumulatively to a “history of the senses” (pp. 3, 193). 
There are many classicists (and others) who, provided they can cope with its demand-
ing intricacies of presentation, will benefit from engaging with P.’s enterprise.
The book sets itself, however, to be more than an ensemble of readings of particular 
texts and artifacts. it commits itself to a global thesis about the nature of (ancient) 
aesthetics, and its success needs to be judged, on its own terms, by the coherence or 
otherwise of this thesis. At this fundamental level, i have to say that i find the book 
far from compelling: it is vitiated by a conceptually tendentious and unstable model 
of aesthetic experience.
The central problem is that P.’s whole case depends on an endlessly repeated but 
inadequately justified dichotomy between aesthetic materialism and formalism (the 
latter sometimes equated with “idealism,” which adds a further layer of conceptual 
uncertainty, though one i lack space to probe in this review). it is difficult to see how 
one can have an aesthetic experience of a statue, melody, or poem without responding 
in some degree to elements of structure, pattern, and organization that belong to its 
“form.” it is also hard to understand how the form of a statue, melody, or poem can 
avoid being a condition of its “matter.” Yet P.’s book is premised on the notion that 
one can have aesthetic experiences of “pure” materiality, which he mostly but not very 
informatively equates with “sensuous appearances.” But what is such materiality? P. 
struggles from the outset to define it, announcing in an alarming tautology that it can 
be “roughly understood as the material nature of matter” (p. 5 n. 5). When he adds to 
that description, “or the subjective sense or feeling one has of this,” it is immediately 
clear that for aesthetic purposes “matter” cannot be a self-sufficient category but is 
always already filtered through operations of the mind. P. is intermittently prepared, 
not least in chapter 2 (which fluctuates bewilderingly in its attempts to get the subject 
in focus), to admit the difficulty of keeping matter and form apart. he chooses an 
epigraph from dewey in which the concepts are described as interchangeable (p. 121), 
and he even goes as far as to state perplexingly that “materialism . . . in its own way 
is a kind of formalism” (p. 117). But this does not stop him from insisting doggedly 
on a polemical polarization of categories and on an aesthetic psychology that sets “the 
world of the . . . senses, . . . the world of hard material objects” in a false dualism with 
“the mind, ideas, and words, . . . the mental or perceptual or linguistic world” (p. 406).
everywhere one turns in this book, P.’s detailed and often illuminating analyses of 
texts and artifacts are patently, irreducibly concerned with the aesthetic intertwining 
of perceptions and ideas, the sensory and the formal, appearances and the linguistic 
interpretation of those appearances. Yet these analyses are swathed in the rhetoric of 
conceptual opposition that i have illustrated. in addition, P. allows himself to blame 
so-called formalists for the schematic contrast on which his own identification of them 
depends. “The mere separation . . . of the material and formal causes of poetry is itself 
a formalistic gesture. Formalism consists in this very abstraction” (p. 101, P.’s ital-
ics). This is not the only place in the book, incidentally, where P. confuses conceptual 
abstraction with the predication of abstract, nonsensory properties. his own statements 
of materialism are full of abstractions.
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The tendentious flaws in P.’s rhetoric are exacerbated by the branding of Plato and 
Aristotle as supreme exponents of the “formalism” that is the supposed antithesis of 
P.’s own “materialism.” it is little short of bizarre that P. can so blithely present the 
two philosophers as a virtual pair of twins in this regard, as though there were little 
or no difference between their attitudes to poetry, music, painting, and so on. he can 
do so only by an act of crude simplification, shackling them together as “idealist or 
formalist in tendency, inasmuch as they valorized either ideal Forms or abstract for-
mal properties and relations, for instance, design and arrangement” (pp. 42–43)—as 
though Platonic “Forms” (which may themselves have a kind of aesthetic dimension 
for the mind that experiences them, as Republic, Phaedrus, and Symposium all sug-
gest) were not of an altogether different order from Aristotelian notions of form in 
poetry or painting. (note the somewhat embarrassed concession, “And while it is true” 
[p. 113]; such occasional concessions, acting as a foil to the bigger picture, play a 
curious role in P.’s rhetoric: e.g., “Which is not to say” [p. 248].) P. is determined to 
discern “a strong Platonic bias” almost everywhere in Aristotle (pp. 141–42). he is 
even prepared, in sheer disregard for the integrity of Aristotelian thought, to associate 
both philosophers equally with belief in “invisible realities lying well beyond the reach 
of the senses” (p. 176).
The conflation of Platonism and Aristotelianism is downright cavalier. it manifests 
its own shortcomings when one notices, for example, that P. can happily invoke Aris-
totle in support of a conception of aisthêsis as a commonality that cuts across different 
sense faculties (pp. 45–46) and can even ascribe to him a conception of “pure aesthetic 
pleasure” in the contemplative use of the senses themselves (pp. 53–55). how, then, 
has P. managed to convince himself that Aristotle was uninterested in the “material-
ity” of art? The answer is: by a mixture of inattention and misreading. he fails to 
notice a passage like De sensu 440a8–10, where Aristotle shows close appreciation 
of a painterly technique of overlaying one color on another in order to depict objects 
seen through water or air. (if the same passage had occurred in empedocles, P. would 
have dwelt on it scrupulously, as he does with the reference to painters and colors 
in empedocles B23.) he nowhere considers Aristotle’s view that musical mimesis 
(expression?) inheres “in the melodies themselves” (Politics 8.5, 1340a38–9). he is 
aware (p. 316) of Aristotle’s keen sensitivity to the special qualities of the tragic actor 
Theodorus’ voice at Rhetoric 3.2, 1404b21–4. Yet he ignores this when rehashing a 
stale old account of Aristotle as antitheatrical (pp. 102–7, compounded later by some 
muddled logic on p. 115). he states, with disturbing inaccuracy, that in chapter 4 of 
the Poetics Aristotle “says” that aesthetic viewing, harmony, and rhythm are not “of 
any importance to his theory of literature” (p. 58). he also wilfully marginalizes the 
Poetics’ various references to beauty, even asserting, in defiance of his own evidence, 
that there is an “overall absence of any concern for beauty” in the treatise (p. 99, 
with some backtracking on pp. 100–101). And P. assumes without justification that 
what Aristotle means by a tragedy’s “form” is a bloodless abstraction, rather than 
something embodied in the full fabric of the work. When P. says that art “cannot help 
but be material, given the very nature of its media” (p. 133, P.’s italics), why would 
Aristotle disagree? One need only refer to the first chapter of the Poetics to see that 
he would not.
even Plato, who seems prima facie to deserve the label of anti-materialist and ideal-
ist, is a far more complicated aesthetic thinker than P. is willing to give him credit for. 
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A glaring demonstration of this point occurs when, to reinforce one of his key tenets, 
the existence of cross-artistic modalities of aesthetic experience, P. cites a passage 
from Republic 3.400d–e (on the relevance of “harmony,” “grace,” “rhythm,” etc. to ex-
perience of both art and life in general—a crucial passage for making sense of Platonic 
aesthetics) in the very act of purporting to illustrate a sensibility that he claims that 
Plato and Aristotle “openly reject” (p. 59). The failure on P.’s part, here and elsewhere, 
to see the bias in his own polemical schematization is troubling, a bias that makes him 
more generally oblivious to the significant strands of sensuality—even eroticism—that 
run through Plato’s dealings with poetry, music, and visual art. What is the bewitching 
allure of homeric poetry to which socrates confesses himself susceptible at Republic 
10.607c–d if not a thoroughly sensual experience? it is deeply regrettable that with 
Plato as with Aristotle P. does not give a reliable or nuanced account of relevant pas-
sages in the dialogues. Thus he takes Gorgias 502c to mean that poetic works “are 
nothing but melody, rhythm, and meter” (p. 255, P.’s italics)—which, if true, would 
surely make Plato an aesthetic materialist by P.’s lights—when socrates in fact says 
that if you remove those elements you are still and always left with logoi, an entirely 
different proposition altogether. sweeping pronouncements such as “Poetry for Plato 
has no true content, and at the extreme it has no content at all” (p. 84), or “Art and 
phenomena in their sensuous appearances are simply uninteresting to Plato” (p. 91), 
are rhetorically reductive evasions of the dialectic of ideas in Ion, Republic, and else-
where. it is possible, as even nietzsche showed, to be a vehement anti-Platonist in 
aesthetics without lapsing from serious critique into distorted caricature.
Part of the price that P. pays for his reductive account of Plato and Aristotle as (in his 
own pejorative sense) “formalists” is that he misses the complexity of the position they 
have come to occupy in the larger history of aesthetics. it is significant, for instance, 
that P. can enlist shklovsky as a materialist after his own heart without stopping to 
notice (even though one of his quotations, on p. 79, actually shows) that shklovsky 
invoked Aristotle as providing a precedent for his concept of linguistic “defamil-
iarisation.” equally, if sontag gets plaudits from P. (p. 81) for stressing the sensuous 
surfaces of art in her essay “Against interpretation,” one needs also to realize that the 
famous final sentence of that essay, “in place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of 
art,” is not far removed from the sentiment of socrates at Republic 3.403c—and less 
surprisingly so when one grasps that sontag’s anti-Platonizing stance is paradoxically 
dependent on quasi-Platonic tropes and imagery. Those are just two brief illustrations 
of how historically as well as intellectually unsatisfactory is P.’s attempt to turn two 
great thinkers into cardboard cutouts.
let me reiterate that this is a work that contains a wealth of stimulating arguments 
and penetrating observations on an impressively large range of material. it supplies 
an important model of how to construct one kind of inclusive, deweyesque perspec-
tive on ancient aesthetics. it is let down, however, by a conceptual framework that is 
insufficiently robust to carry the weight of the project. 1
      Stephen Halliwell 
      University of St Andrews
1. The book has been produced to an extremely high standard. i noticed very few misprints, a great credit 
to the author. But two versions of the same sentence have not been reconciled on p. 12, and “W. K. Wimsatt” 
on p. 374 is a slip, i think, for William empson.
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